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Case Comment
REEVE V. ABRAHAM-CONTRACT-QUASI-CONTRACT-UNJUST ENRICHMENT-IMPROVEMENT OF LAND UNDER MISTAKE OF TITLE--REMEDIES
-In Reeve v. Abraham,' a decision of Buchanan C.J.D.C., sitting as
a local Judge of the Supreme Court of Alberta, certain interesting
questions arose as to the application of the develojing law of Quasicontract.2 The facts, as found by the learned trial Judge, were that
Reeve purchased a farm for the dual purpose of assisting Abraham,
his nephew by marriage, and of securing better than a bank-rate
of interest on his investment. A lease of the property to Abraham
was drawn up, including an option to purchase, and during his tenancy,
Abraham made extensive improvements on the land. The Judge
found that Abraham's tenancy was terminated by the act of the
plaintiff Reeve, and that money was still owing on the work done
on the property. In reply to Reeve's suit for crop-rent (withheld
on advice of counsel), and payment of money owing on a note,
Abraham counterclaimed for the cost of the improvements. The
learned Judge held for Abraham on the broad ground of unjust
entichment, setting off Reeve's claims against the award.3 It is
submitted that the Court's disposition of the lease is open to serious
,criticism. The learned Judge says:
"I am driven to the conclusion that the lease-option failed to express
the mind of either party. I hold, therefore, that I am at liberty to seek
outside the instrument for the terms of the agreement at which the
parties did arrive, an agreement which was in part performed by the
Defendant entering into possession of, farming
and improving the said
lands during a period of four to five years."4

Both parties contended that the lease-option was not drawn
according to the instructions of either of them. The Defendant's understanding was a lease for four years, at the end of which period, "it
automatically and without the execution of a further document,
became an agreement of sale." 5 The Plaintiff's interpretation of the
agreement is difficult to pinpoint in view of his contradictory
evidence. First, he emphatically insists that there was to be no lease;
then, he suggests that the lease was to be for five years, but without
any option to purchase, and finally, he says that the land was to be
purchased for cash at the end of the term. Although the substantial
disagreement may indicate that the lease-option did not conform
with the instructions of either party, thus allowing for the admission
of extrinsIc evidence, it is submitted that this factor does not justify
1 (1957), 22 W.W.R. 429.
2 At the time of writing, this case was under appeal.
3 The writer acknowledges the assistance of Mr. E. F. Murphy, solicitor
for the defendant, who generously provided transcripts of all pleadings,
evidence and exhibits in the case.
4 (1957), 22 W.W.R. 429 at p. 430.
5 Ibid., at p. 430.
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the complete disregard of the provisions of the instrument. In effect,
this procedure was adopted by the learned Judge.
The terms of the lease-option were very clear, and it is material
to reproduce a portion of it here:
-... IN CONSIDERATION of the execution of this lease by the LESSEE
the LESSOR hereby grants to the LESSEE the option irrevocable within
the time hereby limited to purchase the said lands at and for the price of
TWELVE THOUSAND ($12,000.00) DOLLARS cash plus the value of
any improvements put on by the LESSOR during the time of this lease.
THIS OPTION may be exercised by the LESSEE at any time during
the term of this lease. In view of the fact that this land was purchased
by the LESSOR to assist, if possible, the present LESSEE, it is definitely
understood that in the event of light crops or crop failure the LESSEE
may purchase the said land at the end of the period, namely, APRIL 30th,
1955, on such terms as he may deem necessary to enable him to complete
the purchase, it being understood, however, that the full purchase price
should be paid within ten (10) years from the date of the6Agreement for
Sale, interest rate to be five (5%) per cent per annum."
Both the parties had heard the document read and signed it and,
therefore, despite their alleged misunderstanding, must be taken to
know the nature and content of the instrument. This conclusion is
re-inforced by the fact that both acted as if they were bound by the
terms of the lease, the Plaintiff by acceptance of the annual crop-rent,
and the Defendant by taking possession and farming for a period of
more than three years. In these circumstances, would it not have
been more appropriate for the learned Judge to have confined himself
to an interpretation of the instrument which purported to express the
bargain between the parties?
According to the above-quoted clause, it is specified that the
lease was to terminate on April 30th, 1955. The term was, therefore,
four years and not a "four- to five-year period", 7 as found by the
learned Judge. Even more important, the option in the above clause
is clearly stated to be exerciseable during the currency of the lease
up to April 30th, 1955. It was shown at the trial that the defendant
made no attempt whatever to exercise the option. Therefore, the
lease, and with it the option, simply lapsed on that date. Thus, it is
difficult to justify the finding that "the defendant's occupancy of the
lands was terminated by action of the plaintiff, not the defendant."8
In referring to the improvements, the learned Judge says:
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The evidence in support of this finding would appear to be rather
inconclusive.1 0
There was neither obligation on the lessee to make any Improvements, nor agreement to pay for them, but they were made. The
lease is silent on the matter and therefore we are thrown on the law.
What is the proper relief, if any, in a case of this type, and can the
relief actually given be justified on the facts as found?
There is some question as to the nature of the relief granted to
the defendant. The learned Judge holds:
"In my opinion the facts as found by me in the case at bar justify my
invoking the law of quasi-contract or, to adopt Professor Goodhart's
term, the law of unjust enrichment, on the defendant's behalf."11

and also remarks:
"His (defendant's) pleadings are adequate to support a claim for
and in argument he addressed himself to that form of
equitable relief
relief solely."12

and further says:
"I am of the opinion that it would be inequitable, and against conscience,
an unjust enrichment, to permit the plaintiff to secure and retain the
lands by the defendant without reimprovements so placed upon the
compense therefor to the maker."13

These statements render It difficult to determine whether the basis
of the judgment is Equity or Quasi-Contract, or both. On balance,
it would appear that the second ground, i.e. Quasi-Contract, is the
effective basis of relief.
The idea of an obligation, quasi-ex contractu is of Roman origin
and rests on the philosophic base of aequitas.14 Early English Law
indicates the action of "account" as a quasi-contractual remedy. The
growth of aindebitatusassumpsit" kept the idea within the Common
Law while the developing jurisdiction of Equity took over situations
which formerly would have fallen into "account" rather than "debt"
or "detinue".
l0The only evidence which might support this finding is in the crossexamination of Reeve which appears contradictory and unreliable.
Q. MR. MURPHY: Did you ever discuss these improvements with Mr.
Abraham?
A. MR. REEVE: No. I can't say we ever had any discussion about them
at the time it was being done....
Q. Yes. Go ahead.
A. The day we went back across the farm to see the man that owned
it, we walked across the ground and Mr. Abraham said, "Why don't
you buy this place? I will break 50 acres here." I said, "Alright
Irvine."
Mr. Abraham testified that he had mentioned improvements to Reeve and
Reeve had replied "It is your farm, go ahead and improve it." It would
seem that this testimony would require generous interpretation for a finding
of "active encouragement", yet the learned Judge so found.
" Reeve v. Abraham, ante, p. 431. Buchanan, C.J.D.C. is referring to
the term used by the learned author in his book Englishv Law and the Moral
at p. 127.
Law (1953),
1 2 Ibid., at-p. 431.
13 Reeve v. Abraham, ante at p. 432.
4
1 Baxter, Unjust Enrichment in the Canadian Common Law and in
Quebec Law (1954), 32 Can. Bar Rev., 855.
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Lord Mansfield, the great commercial Judge, saw the advantages
in recovery of unjust benefits and tried to extend the scope of
" indebitatus assumpsit, and in doing so, expressed the theory behind
such actions as lying "only for money which ex aequo et bono the
defendant ought to refund.... In one word, the gist of this kind of
action is that the defendant, upon the circumstances of the case, is
obliged by the ties of natural justice and equity to refund the
money."'1 5 It is clear that the "equity" referred to Is not the equity
of the Chancery Court, but the "aequitas" mentioned above. "Lord
1 6
Mansfield was referring to the jus naturaleof the Roman Law."'
The abolition of the old forms of action and the technicalities of
procedure produced legal thinking directed towards classification of
cases into recognized fields of substantive law, e.g., tort, property or
contract. That quasi-contract is a category of substantive law sui
generis has been denied.17 However, later authority indicates that
quasi-contract may be gaining recognition as a remedy distinct from
recovery in contract, which is based upon mutual consent.' 8 It has
only been in the past several decades that this Common Law remedy
of such respectable vintage has been returning to the fore and redeveloping its legal muscles.
In view of this recent development and of the difference of opinion
as to whether the rationale of quasi-contract is the fiction of implied
promise or the prevention of unjust enrichment, it would be helpful
to the profession if the Bench would express reasons for judgment in
the clearest and most precise terminology. If, in a given factual
situation, it is desired to accord relief to a claimant, the field of law
applied, i.e. quasi-contract, equity or statute, should be plainly specified. The result would be the avoidance of confusion between
remedies.
The learned Judge bases his finding for the plaintiff by counterclaim almost entirely on the judgment of Coyne, J. S. in Morrison v.
Canadian Surety,19 a decision of the Manitoba Court of Appeal in
which the law of quasi-contract is dealt With from the historical point
of view and the most authoritative cases and authors are referred to.
After citing leading definitions, Coyne, J.A. goes on to give some illustrations of the application of quasi-contract. Among these examples
is "improvement of land under mistake". 20 The list of heads set out is
taken from Munkman's monograph "Quasi-Contract" 21 where the
learned author sets out in list form all the heads of quasi-contract.
15

16 Moses v. Macferlan (1750), 2 Burr. 1005.

Baylis v. Bishop of London, [1913] 1 Ch. 127 at p. 137, per Farvell
L.J. See generally Cheshire and Fifoot, Law of Contract, 4th ed., pp. 548-550,
Baxter, op. cit., pp. 857-859.
17 Sinclair v. Brougham, [1914] A.C. 398. See particularly the speech of
Lord1 8Sumner at p. 452.
Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. FairbairnLawson Combe Barbour, Ltd.,
[1943] A.C. 32, and see particularly Lord Wright at p. 61. Deglman v.
Guaranty Trust Co. of Canada and Constantineau, [1954] 3 D.L.R. 785.
19 (1954), 12 W.W.R. (N.S.) 57.
20 bid, at p. 81 per Coyne J.A.
21 Sir Isaac Pitman & Sons, Ltd., London (1950), p. 20.
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Under the general category of "Recompense" he includes quantum
mermit, maritime salvage, 22 and improvements to land under mistake,
and goes on to state that this category of the subject is the most doubtful-less developed than Restitution proper or Reimbursement. He
cites no authority of any kind, but merely states that "improvement
of land under mistake" is one category (and a weak one) of quasicontract.23 Thus Buchanan C.J.D.C. bases his judgment in this case
on a simple example cited in obiter by Coyne J.A. and taken from one
author's acceptance of a doubtful head, unsupported by authority.
Since there is disagreement as to whether the true basis of quasicontract is the implication of a promise or the retention of a benefit
unjustly, it is material to consider whether, in this particular state
of facts, either of these possible rationales is applicable. Firstly, can
a promise to reimburse the defendant for improvements be inferred in
these circumstances? The existence of the written contract does not
operate as a bar to implication in view of the silence of the lease on
the subject. However, it is submitted that the lease is an explicable
and viable transaction as it stands and therefore implication of a
promise is not necessary. That the Court will not imply a promise that
is not necessary to the transaction appears well-settled.2 4 Considering
the notion of the presumed intention of the parties as a justification
for the implication of a contractual term, 25 it could be strongly contended that neither party contemplated reimbursement. Indeed, the
divergence in the evidence of the parties26 renders it difficult to
ascertain with any certainty what they did, in fact, contemplate.
Therefore, the general rule that, in the absence of special agreement
to the contrary, improvements follow the reversion, should have commended itself to the attention of the Court. As to unjust enrichment, the real question is whether the plaintiff has acquired a benefit
at the expense of the defendant which he ought to disgorge. On this
point, it must be observed that the defendant enjoyed the advantage
of the improvements during the whole of the currency of the lease in
that he tilled increased acreage with increased yield. Even more
important is the fact that it was within his power to keep the permanent benefit of the improvements simply by exercising the option in the
lease. However he did not offer payment, nor did he indicate any
desire to avail himself of the general instalment provisions of the
option. In these circumstances, it can hardly be said to be unjust to
the lessee if he does not regain what he himself has taken no steps
to retain.
22

From the Roman negotiorum gestio, and the only true example thereof
in our
23 law.
Reference to "improvement of land under mistake" is not found in the
considerations of the subject by Cheshire and Fifoot or Winfield.
24 "A term can only be implied if it is necessary in the business sense to
give efficacy to the contract." Per Scrutton, L.J. in Reigate v. Union Manufacturing Co. (Ramsbottom), [19181 1 K.B. 592, at p. 605. See also, Hivac
Ltd. v. Parik RoyaZ Scientific Instruments Ltd, [19461 Ch. 169, [19461 1 All
E.R. 350, and Kimber v. WiZlett (Williami, Ltd., [19471 K.B. 570.

25 ". . what the law desires to effect by the implication is to give such
business efficacy to the transaction as must have been intended at all events
by both
" The Moorcoc (1889), 14 P.D. 64, at p. 68.
2 6 parties ....
See footnotes 4. 5 and 6 ante.
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As to equitable relief in cases of this type, the rule which is most
often cited s that propounded by Lord Wensleydale in the leading case
of Ramsden v. Dyson: 27
"If a stranger builds on my land, supposing it to be his own, and I,
knowing it to be mine, do not interfere, but leave him to go on, equity
considers it to be dishonest in me to remain passive and afterwards to
interfere and take the profit; but if a stranger build knowingly upon
my land, there is no principle of equity which prevents me from insisting
on having back my land, with all the additional value which the occupier
has imprudently added to it. If a tenant of mine does the same thing,
he cannot insist on refusing to
2 give up the estate at the end of his term.
It was his own folly to build." 8
This formulation of the rule in Ramsden v. Dyson was approved as
recently as 1941 by the Supreme Court of Canada.2 9 The relief given
in these cases is grounded upon a bona fide but mistaken belief as to
title on the part of the improver which is known to the true owner of
30
the property.
Here, therefore, the question is whether Abraham had such a
mistaken belief. His evidence clearly indicates that he knew that he
was a lessee and not an owner. But he further testified that he
thought that the property would pass to him immediately upon the end
of the term and without any further action by either'party. He cannot reasonably have expected, however, that he was to receive the
land without either payment of the price or some agreement therefor.
If mistake there was, it was engendered by his own carelessness in
that he neglected to read the copy of the lease in his possession. To
permit him to rely on such a mistake would appear to place a premium
on carelessness. 31
It is noteworthy that the Alberta legislature has enacted a statutory provision which deals with factual situations of this nature. Sec.
183 of the Land Titles Act,32 reads:

183(1). Where a person at any time has made lasting improvements on
land under the belief that the land was his own, he or his assigns
(a) are entitled to a lien upon the same to the extent of the amount by
which the value of the land is enhanced by the improvements, or
(b) are entitled or may be required to retain the land if the court is of
the opinion or requires that this should be done having regard to
what is just under all the circumstances of the case.
(2) The person entitled or required to retain the land shall pay such
compensation as the court may direct.
Under subsection (1), Abraham would have to show a "belief that the
land was his own" which, as above submitted, was not the case. If,
27
(1866), L.R. 1 H.L., 129.
2
8 Ibid., at p. 168.
2
9 Easte6rbrook v. The King [19311 S.C.R. 210, at p. 219 where Newcombe

J. reproduces the words of Lord Wensleydale verbatim as "very aptly

(stating)
the law as applicable in such cases."
3

o Ramsden v. Dyson, ante, per Cranworth L.C. p. 140 et seq.
31This contention is supported by the reasoning in Fletcher v. Claggett
(1927), 3 D.L.R. 751, at p. 754, where Mackenzie J. remarked ".... a belief
engendered by careless or indifferent conduct.., cannot justly in the language
of the authorities be termed a reasonable or bona fide belief". Although the
case was concerned with statutory relief, it is submitted that this proposition
has equal application in this case.
32R.S.A. 1955, c. 170. See also The Conveyancing and Law of Property
Act, R.S.O. 1950, c. 68, s. 37.
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however, the learned Judge was of the opinion that there was such
a belief, it would have been open to him to apply subsection (1) (b) so
as to require the defendant to retain the land on appropriate terms
fixed by the Court. One of those terms would inevitably be the payment of the purchase price, either at once or by instalments. The net
effect of this procedure would be the same as if the option had been
exercised and the agreement performed. This solution would hold the
parties to their original bargain, and be at least as consistent with the
circumstances as the disposition of the case by the trial judge. In
passing, a problem may be raised as to the basis of calculation of the
quantum of recovery.33 Even accepting
the method of assessment as
correct, the amount awarded is in error.3 4
In conclusion, it is submitted that the learned judge erred in his
findings of fact, his application of law to the facts as found, and his
computation of the amount of recovery. Abraham knew or had means
of knowing his position. He enjoyed the fruits of his improvements
while in possession of the land and could have continued to do so if he
had taken any steps to exercise the option in the lease. It is regrettable that slightly more precision was not used by the learned
judge in dealing with the case, especially in invoking the law of quasicontract, and finally, it is submitted that the enrichment of the defendant by counterclaim, if such there was, was anything but unjust.
JACKSON L. CHERCOVER *
*Mr. Chercover is presently enrolled in the second year Osgoode Hall Law
School.
33
In Stuart v. Taylor (1914), 33 O.L.R. 20, Riddell J. stated that the
proper direction to a Master for the assessment of quantum "will not be as
to the value of the improvements but as 'the amount by which the value of
the land is enhanced by the improvements', quite a different thing." The
cost of the improvements, therefore, is not the test, at least in cases where
the value of the whole land has, ini fact, increased. In the instant case, the
learned Judge made no finding as to whether the value of the land had
increased, decreased or remained constant, but merely awarded the cost of
the improvements.
34The learned Judge says at page 432: "I award the defendant $3,000
in respect of the improvements made by him on the lands in question ... to
be set off against this award are $590 admittedly due on the defendant's
promissory note to the plaintiff and the further $1,000, the value of the
plaintiff's one-third share of the 1955 crop on one of the quarter sections."
He does not see fit to enlighten us as to how he arrived at this figure, but In
his finding of fact he stated at page 430: "These improvements cost the
defendant not less than $3,000, together with extensive labour both by himself
and his family." To be sure, the figure $3,000 was the total amount owing
to a contractor, Scott and Plomas, for improvement work, but $500 of this
was with respect to another property belonging to Abraham and in no way
the subject-matter of this action. The figure $2,500 was mentioned six times
in evidence, i.e.
Q. MR. MURPHY: So the cost of the work done on Mr. Reeve's land

is $2,500?

A. MR. ABRAHAM: Approximately $2,500.
On the Statement of Account from Scott and Plomas which was accepted
by the court as Exhibit 2, we find the statement, "On Section 20 (the land
in question here) we cut and piled and broke for the approximate amount
of $2,500. . ." Abraham also states in evidence that: "I paid out $200 to
different men for picking roots." This would make $2,700 "money cost" as
the learned Judge called it, and one wonders where the other $300 came from
unless the judge in his discretion is having the plaintiff pay for work done
on the defendant's own land.

